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THE MYTH OF STRICT FORECLOSURE
SHmLDON TEFF*
YTHS in the field of mortgages are many and striking. One of
the most striking is the assumption of American students that
the English chancellor left the mortgagor virtually unprotected
from his mortgagee. It is not diffitult to find the reasons for this assump-
tion. In the colonial period of the country the Court of Chancery was in
great disrepute., Time has removed much of the prejudice against
doctrines of the chancellor, but in the field of mortgages the prejudice has
continued. First, the English system of mortgages seems very primitive
to American students. The struggle of junior mortgages to obtain the
status of legal charges has confirmed the tradition that the English
system of mortgages was very slow in developing, and the hocus-pocus of
the long-term lease by which, under the 1925 legislation,2 the second
mortgage emerged as a legal charge tended to confirm the prejudice.
Surely under a system so primitive mortgagors could not have been
adequately protected!
The second reason for the prejudice is based upon the history of the
American law of mortgages. For more than a century the trend of the
American law has been toward greater protection for the debtor. Judges
and legislators have joined in the effort to improve the position of the
mortgagor and yet, as the d6bicle of the last decade shows, the present
American system leaves the mortgagor without adequate protection.
The position of mortgagors who did not have the benefit of the century's
improvements must have been miserable indeed.
But plausible though the argument is, it is unsound. As Professor
Maitland told his students at Cambridge, it is not safe to rely upon the
form of the English mortgage for it is "one long suppressio veri and
suggestio falsi."3
The unsoundness of the argument is apparent if one considers the
developments in the English mortgage law during the past century and
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I Pound, The Place of Judge Story in the Making of American Law, 48 Am. L. Rev. 676,
695-96 (x914).
2 Law of Property Act (1925), i5 Geo. V, c. 20, §§ 85, 86.
3 Maitland, Lectures on Equity 269 (igog).
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the present position of English mortgagors. The last century brought
many changes designed to enlarge rather than to curb the powers of
mortgagees and yet the books are not full of instances of the overreaching
of mortgagors. Even though the political power in England has passed
more and more from the moneyed classes the English legislation con-
tinues to be designed to increase rather than to curb the powers of
mortgagees. England has had its economic "crisis" and has come through
the period without a foreclosure crisis and without a demand for legis-
lation to relieve mortgagors, even though there were modem English
precedents for moratoria legislation.4 Moreover, the maturity of English
mortgages continues to be fixed as a matter of course at six months from
the date of execution.- Today, as for at least a century, practically every
English mortgage (except of course those executed within the preceding
six months) is in default and can be foreclosed if the holder so elects. If
the English mortgagor were not reasonably protected against overreach-
ing it is unthinkable that he should have acquiesced for more than a
century in the practice of fixing maturity at six months.6
The thesis of this essay is that English mortgagors at the beginning of
the nineteenth century were better protected against overreaching than
under the system which has been developed in the most liberal American
institution. It is proposed, first, to consider the remedies available to the
English mortgagee at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and to
sketch the developments of those institutions down to the present; second-
ly, to sketch the remedies of American mortgagees; and finally on the basis
of this comparison to venture suggestions for changes in the American
law of mortgages which can be made without unduly restricting mort-
gagees, and which should be made if mortgagors are to be adequately
protected.
]FORECLOSURE
American students are familiar with the history of the remedy of fore-
closure which the English chancellor developed to relieve mortgagees
4 See Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act (1920), io & ii Geo. V,
c. 17.
S 2 Davidson, Precedents and Forms in Conveyancing pt. 2, 564 (3d ed. x869).
6 The history of approved investments for trust funds may shed light upon the position of
the English mortgagee. Before 1785 a real estate mortgage was deemed a proper security for
the investment of trust funds. In Ex parte Cathorpe, x Cox Eq. i82 (1785), Lord Thurlow
struck the real estate mortgage off the approved list and limited trustees to investment in con-
sols. This continued to be the rule until 1859 when Parliament restored the real estate mortgage
to the approved list. Law of Property and Trustees Relief Amendment (1859), 22 & 23 Vict.,
c. 33, § 32. Quaere do these rules reflect changes in the position of mortgagees, or merely the
desire of the chancellor to support the market for consols?
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after the development of the equity of redemption. Americans commonly
assume, however, that foreclosure was a harsh and inequitable weapon
which enabled mortgagees to take advantage of luckless mortgagors.7
Their reaction to the institution is indicated by the epithet which
was used in America to describe the institution of foreclosure without a
sale-namely, strict foreclosure. 8 Under the English practice the contrast
is between "foreclosure" and "sale in lieu of foreclosure," not between
"strict foreclosure" and "foreclosure by sale" as in America9 The reason
for the English usage is that foreclosure was not in any sense "strict."
The chancellor had been so zealous in his efforts to protect mortgagors
and had devised so many safeguards for mortgagors that the remedy of
foreclosure did not really foreclose. In England, therefore, the demand for
reform in foreclosures came from mortgagees, not mortgagors; the changes
which were made by the courts and Parliament in the English law of
foreclosure during the nineteenth century were designed to relieve
mortgagees and not mortgagors.
In the first place like other proceedings in chancery at this period a
foreclosure was a slow and costly proceeding."° But delays not common to
chancery proceedings in general were a matter of course in foreclosures.
The chancellor, having determined that the right of the mortgagor to
redeem could not be barred by stipulations in the mortgage, was equally
determined that it should not be barred by a decree in chancery until
every opportunity had been given the mortgagor to protect his interest in
the property. When, therefore, after the lapse of many months, the
mortgagee had finally obtained a decree of foreclosure nisi, the proceeding
was far from concluded. The matter was then referred to a master for an
accounting. After the master had computed the balance due for principal,
interest and costs, the mortgagor was allowed, as a matter of course, six
months more in which to redeem.Y If, however, there were junior incum-
brances upon the property it was customary to provide for additional
successive redemption periods of three to six months for each of the junior
7 Perine v. Dunn, 4 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 14o, 143 (18ig); Bolles v. Duff, 43 N.Y. 469, 474
(1871); Jefferson v. Coleman, iio Ind. 5x5 (x886); Bradley v. The Chester Valley R.R. Co.,
36 Pa. i4i, i5o (i86o); 2 Wiltsie, Mortgage Foreclosure § goi (4 th ed. 1927); 8 Carmody, New
York Practice, pt. 2, § 1030 (1933).
842 C. J., Mortgages § i5og, n. 53 (1927). The term "strict foreclosure" was used by
Chancellor Kent in Perine v. Dunn, 4 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 14o, 143 (i819). See also 4 Kent, Com-
mentaries § i81 (14th ed. i896) .
9 For the English usage see 2 Coote, Mortgages 1o49 (9th ed. 1927).
to 9 Holdsworth, History of English Law 335 if. (1926).
i For the typical decree for foreclosure nisi see Seton, Decrees 139 (i83o).
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incumbrances."2 Moreover so careful was the chancellor to protect the
mortgagor's interest that, upon a slight showing, he would extend the
time within which the mortgagor might redeem.'1 In Edward v. CunliffeX4
which is frequently cited to illustrate this practice, the mortgagor obtained
four separate extensions-the last one being granted even though the
court had previously announced that the mortgagor had obtained his
final indulgence. The result was that the mortgagor was allowed a period
of twenty-four months after the date of the decree nisi within which to
redeem the property.
Even after the final extension had expired the right to redeem con-
tinued until the mortgagee obtained a second decree-a decree of fore-
closure absolute. s By this decree the court declared that the mortgagor,
having failed to exercise his right of redemption, was "absolutely debarred
and foreclosed of and from all right, title, interest and equity of redemp-
tion of, in and to the said mortgaged hereditaments."' 6 Final, conclusive
and decisive as this action appeared nevertheless the mortgagee was not
yet in a position to enjoy the property.
In the first place, the chancellor refused to take steps to put the mort-
gagee into possession;17 an action of ejectment was deemed adequate and
the mortgagee had to resort to that unless the mortgagor or his tenant
voluntarily surrendered possession upon demand.
Secondly, even though the foreclosure decree was in name and in terms
absolute the title of the mortgagee was not entirely free from the claim of
the mortgagor. The solicitude of the chancellor for the mortgagor did not,
in spite of the formal finality of a decree absolute, end with the granting
of such a decree. Even after that decree was enrolled the proceedings
might be reopened and the mortgagor given another accounting and
another opportunity to redeem.z8
- Id. at 157 and no. i6i et seq.; 2 Spence, Equitable Jurisdiction 687 (I85o). Under the
modem English practice only one redemption period is allowed; see Fisher and Lightwood,
Law of Mortgage 779 (7th ed. 193i).
13 Ismoord v. Claypool, i Rep. Ch. 262 (A66-67) (extension granted without conditions);
Anonymous, Barn. Ch. 221 (1740); Eyre v. Hanson, 2 Beav. 478 (i84o) (on condition of pay-
ment of amount reported due for interest and costs); Holford v. Yate, i K. & J. 677 (1855) (on
condition of payment of portion of interest in arrears). But some reason (though not a strong
one) must be shown. Nanny v. Edwards, 4 Russ. 124 (1827). For Lord Eldon's opinion of the
undesirable consequences of the practice see Novosielski v. Wakefield, 17 Ves. Jr. 417, 418
(1811) and 2 Maddock, Chancery Practice 492 (4 th Am. ed. 1832).
14 1 Madd. 287 (i816).
15 Senhouse v. Earl, 2 Ves. Sr. 450 (1752).
6 Seton, Decrees 143 (i83o). 17 Id. at 14o, citing Sutton v. Stone, 2 Atk. ioi (i74o).
IS Burgh v. Langton, 5 Br. P. C. 213, 15 Vin. Abr. 476, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 6og (1724) (decree
absolute opened after sixteen years); Jones v. Creswicke, 9 Sim. 304 (839) and cases reported
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So great was the protection accorded the mortgagor that a decree
might be reopened not only against the mortgagee, but also as against a
purchaser from the mortgagee.' 9 Consequently the mortgagee could not
safely contract to convey an unencumbered estate since a title based upon
a foreclosure might be upset by the chancellor upon application of the
mortgagor. His title, therefore, was not marketable until a consider-
able period of time after the foreclosure and would not be forced upon a
purchaser in a suit for specific performance.20 It was for this reason that
in a later period, after powers of sale had been upheld, mortgagees who
had obtained a decree of foreclosure absolute frequently found it desirable
to exercise a power of sale in order to carry through a sale of the premises
even though the exercise of the power opened the foreclosure. X
Foreclosure was, then, not only slow, cumbersome, and costly; it fore-
closed imperfectly. It is not surprising, therefore, that mortgagees should
attempt to obtain substitutes for foreclosure as a means of barring the
mortgagor's interest in the security. One method that was designed to
relieve mortgagees was the same method which in American jurisdictions
has been all but universally adopted to protect mortgagors from the
harshness of "strict" foreclosure. This was a sale before a master of the
therein. In some Canadian cases foreclosure decrees have been opened even after a "Torrens
Act" certificate of title has been issued: Falconbridge, Mortgages 418 (2d ed. i93i). Upon
opening a foreclosure the usual standards for taking accounts against a mortgagee in possession
were sometimes relaxed. Williams v. Box, 24 Manitoba 31 (i913). Cf. Parkinson v. Hanbury,
L.R. 2H.L. i (1867) (one in possession underpurchase based upon a defective exercise of power
of sale was not required to account as a mortgagee in possession); Anchor Trust Co. v. Bell,
[1926] Ch. 8o5, 826.
19 Campbell v. Holyland, 7 Ch. D. i66 (1876). Because of this rule Prof. Maitland advised
his students at Cambridge that "one is not very safe in purchasing a foreclosed estate, and
owing to this meddlesome equity foreclosure is not a procedure upon which prudent mortgagees
will place much of their reliance." Maitland, Lectures on Equity 273 (1920).
20 A case precisely in point has not been found. This would seem to follow from Campbell
v. Holyland, 7 Ch. D. i66 (1876). See i Dart, Vendors and Purchasers 412 (8th ed. 1929).
Compare the contrary opinion of Coventry which was based upon the assumption that a fore-
closure decree would not be reopened as against a purchaser. 2 Powell, Mortgages io02, 1o6,
n. I (6th ed. 1826); In re Power and Carton's Contract, 25 Ch. D. (Ir.) 459 (i8go) (where under
special circumstances a purchaser was required to accept a title based on a foreclosure); Watson
v. Marston, 4 DeG. M. & G. 230 (1853) (where a purchaser who' expected a title based upon
the exercise of a power of sale was not required to accept a title based upon a foreclosure). In
some cases mortgagees who had foreclosed attempted to avoid the possibility that the decree
would be re-opened by obtaining a transfer of the equity of redemption. See i Powell, Mort-
gages 3o6, n. F (6th ed. 1828). Compare the Illinois "quick redemption" practice described in
Katz, Protection of Minority Bondholders, 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 517, 541 (2936).
21 Stevens v. Theatres Ltd., [i9o3] i Ch. 857 and comment thereon in 47 Sol. J. 564 (1903).
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court in lieu of a decree of foreclosure absolute.22 A sale by the court was,
from the point of view of the mortgagee, much superior to a foreclosure.23
In the first place the sale would not normally be postponed at the request
of the mortgagor. Secondly, though the chancellor would refuse confirma-
tion of a sale if the bid were advanced24 once a sale had been confirmed
the successful purchaser would obtain an indefeasible title and the
mortgagor would be limited to the surplus, if any, which remained after
the account for principal, interest and costs had been satisfied out of the
purchase price.25 If the price obtained was less than the amount due, the
mortgagee enjoyed the additional advantage of being able to get a judg-
ment at law for the deficiency without opening the foreclosure .2 From
these points of view a sale in lieu of foreclosure, then, was much superior
to foreclosure. But under the practice of the early nineteenth century a
sale in lieu of foreclosure was not granted as a matter of course. In a few
special cases such relief was sometimes given, but in the ordinary case the
mortgagee had to be content with the inconvenient and inefficient remedy
of foreclosure.7 Not until Parliament came to the assistance of mort-
gagees in 1852 could the English mortgagee generally obtain a decree of
sale in lieu of foreclosure.28 It should be noted, however, that even in
those cases in which a sale was ordered the mortgagee was not, save
in the most unusual case, permitted to purchase at the sale.29 The mort-
gagee could not, then, get the property for a price which he was willing to
bid; and a sale was not sought, therefore, by a mortgagee unless he was
willing to let the property go for a price obtainable from third parties.
Another substitute for a suit to foreclose was the exercise of a power of
sale. In pursuance of authority given in the mortgage deed the mortgagee
sold the property free from the interest of the mortgagor, applied the
- For the earlier English practice see Coote, Mortgages 493 (3 d ed. i85o); 42 C. J., Mort-
gages § 15x, n. 92 (1927); Lansing v. Goelet, 9 Cowen 346, 3 70 ff. (1827).
23 2 Powell, Mortgages io16, n. T (6th ed. 1828).
24 See 2 Daniel], Chancery Practice 1208 (2d ed. 1845); Sugden, Vendors and Purchasers
59 (8th ed. 1830); 2 Dart, Vendor and Purchaser 988 (8th ed. 1929). The practice of opening
biddings was abolished by The Sale of Land by Auction Act 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 48 § 7.
25 See Perry v. Barker, 13 Ves. 198 (i8o6).
26 See note 64 infra.
'7 Coote, Mortgages 493 (3d ed. 185o); 42 C. J., Mortgages § 1511, n. 92 (1927); Adams,
Equity 120 (3d Am. ed. i855); Lansing v. Goelet, 9 Cowen (N.Y.) 346, 370 ff. (x827).
28 Chancery Procedure Amendment Act, z5 & i6 Vict., c. 86, § 48 (1852) replaced by Con-
veyancing and Law of Property Act, 44 & 45 Vict., c. 41, § 25 (2) (1881) which has now been
replaced by Law of Property Act, (1925) 15 Geo. V, c. 20, § 91 (2).
9 Turner, An English View of Mortgage Deficiency judgments, 21 Va. L. Rev. 6oi, 604
(935).
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proceeds of the sale upon the obligation, and paid over the surplus, if any,
to the mortgagor. The power was very broad since the success of the plan
depended upon the ability to give a purchaser at the sale a title free from
the mortgagor's equity of redemption.
At first it was thought by many that such a power would fall necessarily
within the ban of the chancellor against clogs on the right of redemption.3°
Early in the nineteenth century, however, the power of sale was upheld
and by the middle of the century had become a power customarily in-
serted in an English mortgage. 3'
The advantages to mortgagees of the exercise of the power of sale were
many. It was simple and inexpensive. By a sale under the power the
mortgagor's right of redemption could be barred in short order. 32 If the
price obtained was less than the amount due on the obligation, the mort-
gagee could get a judgment for the deficiency without reopening the
foreclosure. 33 But under no circumstances could the mortgagee, by exer-
cising the power of sale, obtain the property for himself free from the right
of the mortgagor to redeem. 34 Consequently it was to the interest of the
mortgagee as well as the mortgagor that the sale be so conducted that
third persons would bid for the property. The mortgagee would really
seek to interest third persons in the property; wide publicity would be
given to the sale so that prospective purchasers would be attracted. Until
a satisfactory sale could be negotiated the power would not be exercised,
and the mortgagee would either wait or resort to a foreclosure action.
The power of sale worked so well in practice that by Acts of Parliament
an extensive statutory power of sale is now implied in the usual English
30 The question is considered doubtful in x Powell, Mortgages 13 ff. (4th ed. i799) and a
power of sale is not included in the mortgage form recommended in the fourth edition of
Powell.
In the sixth edition of Powell, Coventry refers to the power of sale as a modem develop-
ment. 2 Powell, Mortgages 96r, n. A (6th ed. 1828). He includes in his precedents a form for
a power of sale. 3 Powell, Mortgages izir (Rand's 1828 ed.). See also i Powell, Mortgages
12a, n. K (6th ed. 1828); Corder v. Morgan, i8 Ves. Jr. 344 (I81).
31 See i Coote, Mortgages 128 (ist ed. 1821) (where the former doubts are discussed and
dismissed as groundless. A power of sale was not, however, included in the form suggested in
the first edition of Coote). In Clark v. The Royal Panopticon, 4 Drew. 26, 30 (1857), the Vice
Chancellor said that the practice of including a power of sale was not universal.
32 Maitland, Lectures on Equity 278 (19o9); Farrar v. Farrars Ltd., 4o Ch. D. 395 (I888);
Waring (Lord) v. London and Manchester Assurance Co., [19351 1 Ch. 31o (bona fide con-
tract); see 2 Coote, Mortgages 931 (9 th ed. 1927).
33 Rudge v. Richens, L. R. 8 C. P. 358 (1873).
34 2 Coote, Mortgages 934 (9th ed. 1927). Robertson v. Norris, i Giff. 421 (858)(mort-
gagor permitted to redeem fifteen years after such sale); Martinson v. Clowes, 21 Ch. D. 857
(1882) (even though no proof of inadequacy of price).
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mortgage. 35 Today the exercise of a power of sale has all but supplanted
an action for foreclosure as the means of barring the mortgagor's interest
in the security. 36
RENTS AND PROFITS
Under the traditional English mortgage the mortgagee was entitled
(qua mortgagee) to possession and to the rents and profits to be derived
from the security. 37 When, however, the mortgagee of the nineteenth
century had occasion to obtain either possession or rents and profits pend-
ing foreclosure he encountered many difficulties. Even though it was
conceded that the mortgagee might pursue his remedies concurrently, and
in spite of the maxim that when equity assumed jurisdiction it would give
full and complete relief, the chancellor would not aid the mortgagee to
obtain possession or rents and profits either before or after a foreclosure
decree. A writ of assistance was not available either before or, as has
been shown, after the decree.-8 The mortgagor in possession was not
required to account for the benefits derived from possession during the
foreclosure suit,39 nor would the chancellor appoint a receiver to seques-
trate the rents and profits for the benefit of a mortgagee. 40 The reason
given for each of these conclusions was that the legal remedies of the
mortgagee were adequate.
When one examines the remedies of the mortgagee at law in the light of
the rules applied by the chancellor to mortgagees who pursued their
legal remedies the adequacy appears "Pickwickian" and one is tempted to
conclude that mortgagees were left to their legal remedies, even though
inadequate, because the chancellor did not want mortgagors to be dis-
turbed in the enjoyment of the security. True, the mortgagee might, even
during the pendency of the suit for foreclosure, maintain ejectment against
the mortgagor or tenants of the mortgagor whose leases were subordinate
to the mortgage.4" Ejectment, however, though it led to specific relief,
3s Law of Property Act (1925), iS Geo. V, c. 2o, § IOI (i) (i), replacing Conveyancing Act
(i88x), 44 & 45 Vict., c. 41, § 19 (x); see also Lord Cranwortl's Act (x86o) 23 & 24 Vict., C. 145.
36 Turner, An English View of Mortgage Deficiency Judgments, 21 Va. L. Rev. 6oi, 604
(3935).
37 Keech v. Hall, i Doug. 21 (1778); Moss v. Gallimore, i Doug. 279 (1779).
38 Seton, Decrees 14o (1830), citing Sutton v. Stone, 2 Atk. ioo (i74o). An order for pos-
session is now obtainable. Keith v. Day, L. R. 39 Ch. D. 452 (1888).
39 Colman v. Duke of St. Albans, 3 Ves. Jr. 25 (1796) (even though the security was in-
adequate).
40 Berney v. Sewell, i J.&W. 647 (1820); Ackland v. Gravener, 31 Beav. 482 (x862).
Under §25 (8) of the judicature Act, (1873) 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, a receiver may be appointed
at the request of a legal mortgagee. See Tillett v. Nixon, L. R. 25 Ch. D. 238 (1883).
41 Lockhart v. Hardy, 9 Beav. 349 (1846); Booth v. Booth, 2 Ath. 342 (1742).
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was not satisfactory. It was not a summary remedy. Even though
notice was not a condition precedent to the institution of the action,42 a
considerable period of time would expire before the mortgagee could
obtain possession.43 During this period the mortgagor enjoyed the fruits
of possession subject only to personal liability for mesne profits, a liability
which would not presumably net the mortgagee twenty shillings in the
pound since foreclosures would not be normally instituted against solvent
mortgagors.
The legal remedies of the mortgagee were inadequate also because the
mortgagee could not collect rents due from the mortgagor's tenants under
leases which were subordinate to the mortgage. The demand of the
mortgagee was treated as the assertion of a paramount title and an action
for rent under such leases would fail for want of privity of estate.44 Con-
sequently the mortgagee who pursued his legal remedies had either to
operate the property, to find new tenants for the property, or to negoti-
ate new leases with the old tenants. The task of management which con-
fronted the mortgagee who had asserted his right to possession was not
merely one which he might find inconvenient or irksome but one which
might result in serious financial liability. 45 Upon mortgagees in possession
the chancellor imposed the duty of managing the premises-not merely
as they did their own affairs but according to the high standards of the
chancellor-standards which were in many respects comparable to those
imposed upon trustees. The mortgagee in possession was required to ac-
count not merely for the profits that he got from the premises, but for what
he might have got from the premises.46 The assumption of this liability was
attended with much risk. The mortgagee in possession acted at his peril
since he did not have, as did trustees, the benefit of a bill for instructions.
Furthermore the task of management was unusually difficult. All leases
subordinate had been terminated;47 new arrangements had to be made for
42 Doe v. Maisey, 8 B.&C. 767 (1828); Doe v. Giles, 5 Bing. 421 (1829).
43 Under the specimen forms in Runnington, Ejectment 477, app. 11, VI (1st Am. ed.
18o6) eight months elapsed; in re Doe d. Basto v. Cox, L.J. 17 (Q.B.) (n.s.) 3 (1847), posses-
sion was obtained in about eleven months. In Warren, Ten Thousand a Year, the villain ob-
tained possession in a few days less than five months (but the hero would not authorize his
counsel to use dilatory tactics).
44 Evans v. Elliot, 9 Ad. & E. 342 (i838). This rule has been partially repealed by statute.
See Law of Property Act, (I925) 15 & i6 Geo. V, c. 20, § 99.
4S 2 Coote, Mortgages 828 ff., esp. 829, n. h (gth ed. 1927); 2 Davidson, Precedents and
Forms in Conveyancing, pt. II, 822 (3 d ed. i869).
46 White v. City of London Brewery Co., L.R. 42 Ch. D. 237 (1889); 23 Halsbury, Laws of
England, Mortgages 549 ff. (2d ed. 1936).
47 See note 37 supra.
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the entire premises under difficult circumstances, since the mortgagee could
not create a lease binding on the mortgagor. 48 Furthermore the property
would require a great deal of attention, since it would usually be in a run-
down condition as a result of the attempt of the hard-pressed mortgagor
to maintain it with a minimum of expense. The mortgagee, however, was
not given any allowance to compensate for the time which he spent in
managing the property even though he had expressly stipulated for such
an allowance.49 He could not avoid the responsibility of management by
delegating it to an agent or a receiver. Having taken possession he could
not, if he found the task of management more difficult than he had
thought, avoid further liability by surrendering possession to the mort-
gagor.50 If he transferred the mortgage and possession of the property to a
third person he was accountable for the management of his successor as
well as for his own.s' Upon him rested the duty of management and the
liability to account for his management until such time as the mort-
gagor's right to redeem should be finally barred.
Moreover the possession of the mortgagee frequently complicated and
delayed the foreclosure. The possession made the taking of accounts
before the master more complicated. Furthermore the receipt of rent
after the master had reported and before the date appointed for redemp-
tion necessitated a new accounting and automatically enlarged the time
within which the mortgagor might redeem.2 Because of these difficulties
the English conveyancers refused to acquiesce in the opinion of the
chancellor that the mortgagee's legal remedies were adequate and warned
their clients and readers that only in the most unusual circumstances
48 Hungerford v. Clay, 9 Mod. I (1722) (unless in case of necessity). This difficulty has
been remedied by § 18 of the Conveyancing Act, (1881) 44 & 45 Vict., C. 41, now replaced by
§ 99 of the Law of Property Act, i5 & i6 Geo. V, c. 20 (1925).
49 Chambers v. Goodwin, 9 Ves. Jr. 254 (i8o4); Broad v. Selfe, 9 Jur. (n.s.) Ex. 885 (1863);
French v. Baron, 2 Atk. 120 (i74o); Barrett v. Hartley, L.R. 2 Eq. 789 (x866); compare,
however, 23 Halsbury, Laws of England, Mortgages 417 (2d ed. 1936).
soIn re Prytherch, Prytherch v. Williams, L.R. 42 Ch. D. 590, 599 (i889); cf. County of
Gloucester Bank v. Rudry Merthyr Steam & House Coal Colliery Co., [1895] 1 Ch. D. 629.
51 See note I, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 328 (1792); Venables v. Foyle, i Ch. C. 3 (i66o). As was point-
ed out in Davidson, 2 Precedents & Forms in Conveyancing, pt. II, 823 (3 d ed. x869), unless
consent of the mortgagor could be obtained a mortgagee in possession would find it almost
impossible to transfer his interest because of the difficulty of stating the account without the
concurrence of the mortgagor. Macclesfield v. Fitton, i Vern. 168 (1683).
s Garlick v. Jackson, 4 Beav. x54 (1841); Buchanan v. Greenway, 12 Beav. 355 (1849)
(receipt of less than £ 7 of rents entitled mortgagor to a new account and an extension not to
exceed three months). Compare receipt of rent after redemption date, but before decree
absolute entered: National Permanent Mutual Benefit Building Society v. Raper, [1892] 1
Ch. D. 54.
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should mortgagees assert their right to possession during a foreclo-
sure.
53
In the course of the nineteenth century a conveyancing device was
developed to enable mortgagees to collect rents during foreclosure without
incurring the risks and responsibilities of a mortgagee in possession. This
was the inclusion in the transaction of a power upon the mortgagor's de-
fault in the payment of interest to appoint a receiver to collect rents and
apply them on the interest due.54 The receiver, though appointed by the
mortgagee, was deemed the agent of the mortgagor, and the mortgagee
was not liable for his defaults or held accountable as a mortgagee in
possession.55 This device had the further advantage to the mortgagee in
that by it he could obtain the benefit of leases which were subordinate to
the lien of the mortgage. s6 It should be noted that, though it enabled the
mortgagee to reach rents for the purpose of keeping down the interest, it
did not overthrow the arrangements which the mortgagor had made, and
did not, therefore, subject mortgagors to liability to their tenants. It
merely insured that whatever profits were derived from the premises
would be applied to reduce the interest charges on the mortgage and
would not be diverted to other purposes; it did not, as did the entry by the
mortgagee work havoc with the affairs of the mortgagor and was not,
therefore, set aside by the chancellor as were various stipulations designed
to relieve mortgagees in possession of the burdens of management and the
duty to account. This device, as did the power of sale, obtained the
sanction of Parliament and is now a statutory power available to English
mortgagees.57
DEFICIENCY
The chancellor did not afford the mortgagee a practical method of
reaching unmortgaged assets. Here also the extreme solicitude of the
chancellor for the mortgagor is apparent. At one time it was thought
S3 2 Davidson, Precedents and Forms in Conveyancing, pt. II, 638 (3d ed. I869): "The
situation of a mortgagee in possession is far from an eligible one. On the principle that a
mortgagee must make no advantage out of his mortgage beyond the payment of principal,
interest and costs, he is bound to account upon terms of greatest strictness." 3 Bythewood
and Jarman, Conveyancing 9o5 (4th ed. 1886): "But, with all the care that can be taken, the
situation of a mortgagee in possession is not to be coveted." See also 7 Holdsworth, History
of English Law 375 (1926); Maitland, Lectures on Equity 274 (1909); 2 Coote, Mortgages 828
(9 th ed. 1927); Hanbury, Equity 413, cf. 416 (1935); Mortgagees in Possession, io6 L. T. 407
(1899).
S4 2 Davidson, Precedents and Forms in Conveyancing, pt. II, 642 (3d ed. i868).
5s Ibid. s6 Ibid.
57 Conveyancing and Law of Property Act (1881), 44 & 45 Vict., c. 41, § 19 (iii), now super-
seded byLawof Property Act, (1925), i & i6 Geo.V, c. 20, § ioi (i) (iii).
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that the foreclosure operated as a complete bar to an action on the debt.s8
Though this view was rejected at a fairly early period, nevertheless the
mortgagee was left without an effective method of reaching the unmort-
gaged assets.
The chancellor refused to give anything in the nature of a deficiency
decree5 9 The maxim that equity having assumed jurisdiction for one
purpose will retain it and give complete relief was held not to justify a
deficiency decree as an incident of a foreclosure suit. If the mortgagee
wanted to enforce the debt he had to resort to his legal remedies and incur
the expense and possible delay of a separate proceeding. Had this been
the limit of the impediments in the way of a deficiency the position of the
mortgagee would not have been particularly difficult since a judgment at
law carried costs. But a much more serious barrier to the mortgagee's
attempts to reach unmortgaged assets was the rule that an action on the
debt after foreclosure automatically reopened the foreclosure and re-
instated the mortgagor's equity of redemption.k° In other words the price
of getting judgment at law was the surrender of the benefit of the fore-
closure; unless the mortgagee was willing or able to pay this price he
could not reach other assets. Thus if he had disposed of the property the
action on the debt would be enjoined.6' Save in the most unusual case,
then, the mortgagee who had foreclosed the security did not have a
practical remedy to reach unmortgaged assets. To avoid this predicament
the mortgagee might resort to an action on the debt before foreclosure and
then, having failed to get satisfaction of the judgment, foreclose the
security.2 This was not feasible in the usual case not only because of the
cost of two proceedings but also because this would necessarily delay the
foreclosure decree until the action at law was concluded, and during this
period as has been seen the mortgagee did not have a practical remedy to
sequester the rents and profits.63 Furthermore the mortgagor against
whom foreclosure would be sought would not normally have at that time
other assets that could be reached by a judgment at law.
When, in the second half of the nineteenth century, power of sale and
sale in lieu of foreclosure were developed a more satisfactory method of
reaching unmortgaged assets was possible. The price realized at a sale
58 See Perry v. Barker, 13 Ves. x98 (i8o6).
59 Maitland, Lectures on Equity 271 (i909). The rule has been changed in the Judicature
Act, (1875) 38 & 39 Vict., c. 77; see Poulett v. Hill, [1893] I Ch. D. 277.
60 Dashwood v. Blythway, i Eq. Cas. Abr. 317 (1729); Lockhart v. Hardy, 9 Beav. 349
(1846).
61 Perry v. Barker, 13 Ves. Jr. 198 (i8o6).
62 See 2 Coote, Mortgages 9o6 (9th ed. 1927). 63 See page 582 supra.
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either under a foreclosure or under a decree for sale in lieu of foreclosure
fixed the value of the security and consequently the balance remaining
unsatisfied after the security had been exhausted.64 Though the chancellor
still would not enter a decree for the balance as an incident of the suit to
foreclosure he did not place impediments in the way of the mortgagee who
sought a deficiency judgment at law. The action at law was not in this
case deemed to open the foreclosure and to entitle the mortgagor to an-
other chance to redeem. One advantage to mortgagees or a sale instead of
a foreclosure was that it made it possible for the mortgagee to reach un-
mortgaged assets which the mortgagor might obtain after the sale. But
even after the many improvements in the remedies of mortgagees it is not
possible under the present English practice for the mortgagee to obtain the
security free from the redemption right of the mortgagor, to fix the amount
to be credited on the debt, and then to obtain a deficiency judgment for the
balance. If the English mortgagee wants the property free from the right
to redeem he must forego a deficiency judgment; if he wants a deficiency
judgment he must be content to let the security go for an amount to be
obtained at a sale to a third person. s
SUMIMARY OF ENGLISH REMEDIES
It is evident, then, that the remedies of English mortgagees at the
beginning of the nineteenth century were not harsh and severe; fore-
closure did not foreclose effectively; possession or rents and profits pending
foreclosure could be got only at great risk; a deficiency judgment could be
obtained only in exchange for revival of the right to redeem. In the course of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the position of the mortgagees has
been materially improved; effective substitutes have been found for the in-
effective foreclosure; by the power to appoint a receiver of rents upon de-
fault the mortgagee may have the mortgagor's rents applied to keep down
interest; and a practical method of obtaining a deficiency judgment has
been developed. But in spite of the vast improvement in the position of
English mortgagees, English mortgagors enjoy a degree of protection
against overreaching that is not available to American mortgagors.
AMERICAN SYSTEM
One who is familar with the American law of mortgages will have no
difficulty in making the comparison of the position of English mortgagees
with that of American mortgagees. For the purpose of emphasis, how-
64 Rudge v. Richens, L.R. 8 C.P. 358 (1873); Gordon Grant & Co. v. Boos, [1926] A.C. 781.
6s Turner, An English View of Mortgage Deficiency Judgments, 21 Va. L. Rev. 6oi (1935);
see also Turner, The English Mortgage of Land as a Security, 2o Va. L. Rev. 729 (1934).
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ever, it is proposed to survey briefly the remedies of mortgagees under
typical American systems and upon the basis of the comparison to sketch
changes that should be made if mortgagors are really to be protected
against overreaching by mortgage creditors.
FoREcLoSURE IN ANMRICA
The American law of mortgages was based upon the English system
and though in some colonies there was a strong prejudice against the
English court of chancery the basic institutions in the field of mortgages
were English. In most jurisdictions the right of the mortgagor to redeem
was extinguished as in England by a foreclosure suit." But the American
suit differed from the English institution in a number of important
particulars. In the first place a foreclosure suit became a much more
summary remedy in the American courts. To some extent this was be-
cause American courts functioned more efficiently than did the English
court of chancery.67 But foreclosure was more summary and justified the
description of "strict" primarily because American judges failed to show
the same solicitude for mortgagors that characterized the action of the
English chancellor. Extensions and delays were granted much less frequent-
ly than under the English practice' and mortgagors were almost never
given an opportunity to redeem after a decree absolute was entered. 69
The decree meant in America what it had always appeared to mean-that
the mortgagor was really foreclosed of all interest in the premises. The
effects of the decree were particularly harsh not only because extensions
were not freely granted, but also because of the violent and extreme
fluctuations in the value of land in America.
6 1 In a few New England states early statutes provided for foreclosure by entry or by a
writ of entry. These are governed by equitable principles: see 3 Jones, Mortgages cc. 29, 30
(8th ed. 1928); Holbrook v. Bliss, 9 Allen 69 (1864). In Pennsylvania the remedy of a mort-
gagee for the enforcement of the security was a writ of scirefacias. See 3 Tiffany, Real Prop-
erty § 653 (2d ed. 1920).
67 See note (a), 7 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 346 (1823), to the effect that Chancellor Kent upon his
retirement had disposed of every case and motion brought before him.
68 In 3 Jones, Mortgages § 1994 (8th ed. 1928) it is stated that the time for redemption may
be enlarged provided a satisfactory reason is shown. All of the cases cited are English except
Downing et al. v. Pabmateer, r T.B. Mon. 64 (1824) (dictum). See also note 3 Bland ch. I96
(1841). In this connection it should be noted that the English practice of permitting redemp-
tion until a second decree had been obtained was not followed in some American jurisdictions:
see Ellis v. Leek, 127 Ill. 6o, 20 N.E. 218, 3 L.R.A. 259 (1889).
69 3 Jones, Mortgages § 2000 (8th ed. 1928). Cf. Doty v. Whitlesey, i Root 310 (I79i);
Bostwich v. Stiles, 35 Conn. i95 (1868). In some instances a comparatively long redemption
period was allowed: see Austin v. Burbank, 2 Day 474 (1807); Langdon v. Stiles, 2 Aiken
184 (1827).
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To avoid the harshness of the American foreclosure decree various
devices were attempted. First during the early depressions, since the
judges refused to grant extensions to mortgagors, legislatures enacted
moratorium statutes which in effect directed the courts to keep open the
right of the mortgagor to redeem for a longer period than that usually
allowed. ° These were, of course, emergency measures and were either
repealed or became obsolete after the depressions were over.
Another device relied upon to protect mortgagors from the harsh opera-
tion of foreclosures was, paradoxically, the very one to which English
mortgagees resorted to avoid the inconveniences of the English foreclosure
decree-namely, foreclosure by judicial sale. At a comparatively early
date foreclosure by sale was quite generally substituted for a decree of
strict foreclosure.71 In some early cases mortgagors complained that fore-
closure by sale benefited mortgagees and sought to have mortgagees
limited to a decree of strict foreclosure. This objection, though sometimes
conceded by the courts, was brushed aside on the ground that the sale
would equally benefit mortgagors.72 Foreclosure by sale, then, became in
many jurisdictions the usual method of barring the mortgagor's right to
redeem. 73 But there were a number of differences between the American
and the English foreclosure by sale.
The most important difference was that in America the mortgagee
might become the purchaser at the sale and obtain the property free from
the interest of the mortgagor.74 The justification for this departure from
the English practice was that the mortgagee, in view of his interest in the
premises, was likely to bid more than strangers, and that, since the sale
was conducted by an officer of the court and not by the mortgagee or his
representative, the reason for the English rule barring the mortgagee from
purchasing was not applicable.7- However sound this argument seems, in
practice the rule did not work well.
When the mortgagee was permitted to bid, he had no incentive to
postpone the sale until third persons had been interested in the property
and an opportune time to sell had arrived. Whatever the circumstances
of the sale, the mortgagee's interests would be protected by his bid. Con-
sequently under the American practice the mortgagee sought to have the
70 Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study, 46 Harv. L. R. io6i (1933). For a
discussion of the demands for bankruptcy legislation, see Warren, Bankruptcy in United
States History (1935).
713 Jones, Mortgages § i6go (8th ed. 1928).
72 Lansing v. Goelet, 9 Cowen 346 (z827). 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence § 1025, n. i
(13th ed. 1886).
73 See note 71 supra. 74 3 Jones, Mortgages § 2101 (8th ed. 1928). 7S Ibid.
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sale set for the earliest possible date; the only publicity given it by the
mortgagee was that required by the statute or decree, usually an obscure
legal notice in an obscure legal newspaper. In practice, therefore, the
mortgagee had little competition at the sale and usually became the
successful bidder.
For these reasons it was thought by many that the sale in lieu of fore-
closure was not sufficient to relieve mortgagors of the objections to the
American decree of strict foreclosure. Consequently demand was made
for a right to redeemfrom the purchaser at the sale, and in the course of the
nineteenth century such rights were very generally given mortgagors and
parties interested in the property by statutes creating so-called "statutory
rights of redemption. ' ' 7 These made it difficult to perfect the title of the
purchaser in a comparatively short period and almost invariably dis-
couraged strangers who might otherwise have bid for the property.77 In
spite of these rather obvious objections, however, statutory rights of
redemption exist today in many American jurisdictions, and are justified
on the ground that they are necessary to prevent the property going for
an excessively low bid.75 Insofar as these rights do deter outside bidders,
the sale continues a mere form-a device by which the mortgagee an-
nounces the amount of credit on the debt which he is willing to allow for
the property which has been transferred to him under the foreclosure. 79
But, as experience in times of economic stress shows, it is not an effi-
cient device for determining value. To meet this objection the statutes
in some jurisdictions provide for appraisals, and the fixing of upset prices,
but these, too, have tended to discourage bidding and a foreclosure sale
has become even more than ever a sale in name alone.8"
To avoid the expense and delay of foreclosure in court American con-
veyancers frequently included in the mortgage a power of sale.' In some
jurisdictions the courts held these powers invalid either as a result of
statutes expressly declaring them void or as "clogs on the right to re-
deem.,,82
76 Durfee and Dodridge, Redemption from Foreclosure-The Uniform Mortgage Act,
23 Mich. L. Rev. 825 (1925).
77 Ibid.
7s Ibid.; see a useful table in Handbook of the National Conference of Commissions on
Uniform State Laws, 280 (1922).
79 See note 97 infra. See also Sutherland, Foreclosure and Sale, 22 Corn. L.Q. 216 (937)
so3 Jones, Mortgages § 2074 (8th ed. 1928); Durfee and Dodridge, Redemption from
Foreclosure-The Uniform Mortgage Act, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 825, 834 (1925).
8' 41 C. J., Mortgages § 1007 (1926); 4 Kent, Coin. 146 (12th ed. i896).
82 Durfee, Cases on Mortgages 355, n. 23 (1915); 41 C. J., Mortgages §§ 1342, 1343 (1926).
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From the point of view of mortgagees the power of sale has the advan-
tages of the English power as a method of barring the right to redeem, with
the additional advantage that either under a statute or under a stipulation
in the power the mortgagee may bid at the sale and, if successful, obtain
the property free from the interest of the mortgagor.83 As a result the sale
under a power tends to be in practice a formality for the barring of the
right to redeem and in an even more intensified degree is vulnerable to all of
the objections to the American foreclosure by judicial sale. In a number
of jurisdictions, however, the power of sale has been upheld and is the
usual method by which mortgages are foreclosed4
POSSESSION OR RENTS AND PROFITS PENDING FORECLOSURE
Though foreclosure in America is, from many points of view, a more
summary remedy than the English remedy, it frequently, becomes impor-
tant for the mortgagee, if possible, to obtain possession or rents and profits
before a foreclosure has been concluded. In the early period the principles
applicable to this relief were from a superficial point of view the same as
those applicable in England. The chancellor would not put the mortgagee
into possession of the property during the foreclosure. 8s He would not
require a mortgagor in possession to account for rents and profits, 86 nor
would he appoint a receiver to sequestrate rents and profits preceding
foreclosure; 87 as in England the mortgagee's legal remedies were deemed
adequate. Those remedies might generally be pursued independently of,
or concurrently with, the suit to foreclose and to those remedies the
mortgagee who sought possession or rents and profits was left.
As in England the remedy was ejectment. This remedy was subject to
all of the objections of the English remedy: it was not summary; its
83 41 C. J., Mortgages § 1430 (1926).
84 See Handbook, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform StateLaws 280 (1922).
Foreclosure by exercise of a power of sale is the normal form of foreclosure. Under the Uniform
Real Estate Mortgage Act §§ 13 et seq. (1927). A title based upon a sale under a power is not
readily marketable in some jurisdictions because of the absence of an adjudication of the
existence of the incumbrance or the validity of the proceedings under the power. See Durfee,
Cases on Mortgages 371, n. 28 (1915). To meet this objection statutes sometimes provide for
a summary of confirmation. See 2 Bagby's Md. Ann. Code art. 66 § 9 (1924).
A committee of the Chicago Bar Ass. recently favored this device. 17 Chicago Bar Record
199 (1936).
85 But after the foreclosure is complete the purchaser or the mortgagee may secure an order
for possession. See Schenck v. Conover, 13 N.J. Eq. 220, 78 Am. Dec. 95 (186o)- 2 Jones, Mort-
gages § 89o (8th ed. 1928).
86 2 Jones, Mortgages § 1432 (8th ed. 1928).
'7 Cortleyeu v. Hathaway, ii N.J. Eq. 39 (855); Williams v. Robinson, i6 Conn. 517
(i844); Morrison v. Buckner, Fed. Cas. 9844 (1843). Compare, however, the New York
rule. Bank of Ogdensburgh v. Arnold, 5 Paige (N.Y.) 38 (1835).
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prosecution automatically cancelled existing leases subordinate to the
mortgage and left the mortgagee confronted with the task of making new
arrangements for the utilization of the premises.8 A mortgagee in posses-
sion was required to account for the profits derived from possession.5 9
But the standards applied by the American courts for the accounting
were not, however, as strict as those of the English chancellors.
American judges were inclined to be more lenient toward mortgagees in
possession. Though the mortgagee in possession was said to be account-
able for what he received, or for what, but for his wilful default, he might
have received from the premises, in practice this meant that he would be
accountable for what he actually received but not for more unless he had
been grossly careless in managing the property.90 Furthermore the period
during which the mortgagee in possession would be required to account
was shorter and its limits were more easily foreseeable at the time when
possession was taken than under the English practice. Foreclosures were
not extended as under the English practice and when the decree of fore-
closure was entered it was almost never opened. Consequently American
mortgagees were not generally warned that the risks incident to pos-
session as a mortgagee were so great that a prudent mortgagee should only
take possession as a last resort. 9' In fact the approved and usual method
of foreclosure in some jurisdictions was entry into possession or a writ of
entry, the assertion of which led to possession; and in such jurisdictions as
a matter of course the mortgagee held possession of the premises during
the period allowed by the statute for the redemption of the premises.92
In the course of the nineteenth century a number of changes were made
in this field. In many jurisdictions either by statute or by judicial rule
mortgagees were deprived of the right to possession qua mortgagee.93 It
was deemed undesirable to permit the mortgagee to take over control of
the premises until after the mortgagor had been foreclosed. To accom-
plish this end the remedies by which he might formerly have obtained pos-
session were denied to him. If the policy upon which these changes appear
to have been based had been followed consistently the mortgagee would
not, in such jurisdictions, have been able to reach the rents and profits of
8Tiffany, Real Property § 614 (a) (2d ed. 1920).
89 2 Jones, Mortgages § 1425 ff. (8th ed. 1928). See also 35 Col. L. Rev. 1248 (1935).
90 See id. at § 1438. In some cases the mortgagee in possession is given a commission for
managing the property; see 24 Col. L. Rev. 318 (1924).
91 Durfee, Cases on Mortgages 382 (19x5), does however give such a warning.
92 See note 66 supra. 93 Walsh, Mortgages ig ff. (1934).
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the security pending the foreclosure proceedings. This appears to be the
present situation in some jurisdictions.94 But in a number of states, even
though the legislature had abolished the right of the mortgagee to posses-
sion, a mortgagee might, under certain circumstances, obtain rents and
profits during the foreclosure. Thus in a number of jurisdictions after the
remedy of ejectment was abolished the chancellor would, upon a showing
of a need of reaching rents and profits, or in pursuance of a stipulation in
the mortgage, appoint a receiver to sequestrate rents and profits during
the foreclosure.' 5 Likewise to a limited extent the statutory restrictions
might be avoided if certain stipulations, as for example, a pledge or an
assignment of rents, were included in the mortgage deed.96 Then, too, the
courts generally decided that a mortgagee who had been permitted to
enter as a mortgagee would not be evicted unless the obligation secured by
the mortgage had been discharged. 97 In spite of the various limitations
then, an American mortgagee today may in many jurisdictions reach rents
and profits pending foreclosure. And though the remedies available (as
for example receiverships) are not efficient they are generally remedies
which may be used by mortgagees without great risk and without re-
leasing the mortgagor's tenants.98 Furthermore it should be noted that
under the modem moratorium statutes the mortgagor may obtain an
extension of the time for redemption only on condition that he account to
the mortgagee for the rents or the value of possession during the exten-
sion. 9 In any event modern American courts do, under many circum-
stances, assist the mortgagees in reaching rents and profits pending fore-
closure, even at the cost of depriving mortgagors of possession of the
security.
DEFICIENCIES
The inadequacy of the American system from the point of view of
mortgagors is especially clear in connection with deficiencies. Though the
American courts originally followed the English rule that the mortgagee
94 See 4 A. L. R. i4o8 (1919); 87 A. L. R. 626 (1933).
9s See, 44 Yale L. J. 701 (1935); 26 A. L. R. 33 (1926); 36 A. L. R. 6og (1925); 55 A. L. R.
533 (1928); 87 A. L. R. ioo8 (1933)."
96 A. L. R. 1405 (1919); 55 A. L. R. 1020 (1928); 87 A. L. R. 625 (1933); 43 Yale L. J. 107
(1933).
97 2 Jones, Mortgages §§ 886-87 (8th ed. 1928); cf., however, cases cited id. § 888 (8th ed.
1928).
9 See 2 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 33 (1934).
"Home Bldg. and L. Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231 (i933).
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must go to the law courts if he wanted to reach unmortgaged assets, 00
none of the other English impediments were put in his way.'0T It was
early established that the action on the debt did not reopen the fore-
closure and revive the right of the mortgagor to redeem."°2 To prevent
"double" satisfaction a judgment on the debt after foreclosure would be
limited to the difference between the value of the security, determined
normally by the verdict of the jury in the action for the deficiency, and
the amount of the debt plus interest and costs. 03 Under this system
excessive deficiency judgments were not common.
But when foreclosure by judicial sale or by the exercise of a power of
sale was substituted for strict foreclosure it was decided that the amount
to be credited on the debt for the security seized by the creditor was con-
clusively determined by the amount realized at the sale.104 The debtor
was then protected against double satisfaction only if the amount of the
bid equaled or exceeded the value of the security. But since confirmation
would not be refused or a sale out of court set aside on the ground that
amount of the bid was less than the value of the property0 5 and since in
many cases the bid represented merely the amount of credit on the debt
which the mortgagee was willing to allow for the security, the mortgagor
had little protection against an unduly large deficiency judgment save the
zoo Dunkley v. Van Buren, 3 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 330 (1818); Cobb v. Duke, 36 Miss. 6o,
72 Am. Dec. i57 (i858); Union Trust Co. v. Detroit Trust Co., 243 Mich. 451, 22o N.W. 728
(1928). Contra, Young v. Vail, 29 N. M. 324, 222 Pac. 912, 34 A. L. R. 98o (i924). See 27
Mich. L. Rev. 797 (1929).
10, In Connecticut a foreclosure decree was originally held to be a bar to an action on the
debt. Derby Bank v. Landon, 3 Conn. 62 (i8xg). The rule was changed by statute in 1833;
see Conn. Public Acts 1833, c. i8. In Illinois a decree of strict foreclosure is probably a
bar to a deficiency since the relief will not be given unless the mortgagee offers to take the
property in satisfaction of the debt. See Carpenter v. Plagge, 192 Ill. 82 (19oi). Cf., however,
Vansant v. Allmon, 23 Ill. 26 (1859).
'Hatch v. White, 2 Gall. 152 (I814); Lansing v. Goelet, o Cowen 346 (1827); contra,
Lovell v. Leland, 3 Vt. 58 (1831) (dictum).
113 Hatch v. White, 2 Gall. 152 (1814); Amory v. Fairbanks, 3 Mass. 562 (1793) (execution
awarded for balance due on bond after deducting value of the security according to appraise-
ment).
14 See Walsh, Mortgages 317 (i934); 3 Jones, Mortgages § 2206 (8th ed. i928). For ex-
treme applications see Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Insurance Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 423
(1936); 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 677 (i937); Ivanhoe Building and Loan Ass'n v. Orr, 295 U.S.
243 (1935); In re Howell, 215 Fed. i (CCA 2d) (1914); Equitable Trust Co. of New York v.
Western Pacific Ry. Co., 244 Fed. 485 (1917). See also Sturges, Cases on Credit Transactions,
870 (2d ed. 1936).
os 3 Jones, Mortgages §§ 2107, 21o8 (8th ed. 1928).
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indulgence of his mortgagee.Io ° This was especially true after it had been
determined that it was proper to include an order for payment of the
deficiency as a part of the foreclosure suit. 0 7 To some extent this hard-
ship has been alleviated by the statutory devices of appraisal, upset price,
stays and rights to redeem from the purchaser at the sale. 0 But since
these have tended to discourage outside bidders and have resulted in the
sale being merely a formal step in a foreclosure the mortgagor under the
American system has little protection from a mortgagee who is inclined to
seek an excessively large deficiency judgment. °9
SUMMARY OF AMERICAN SYSTEM
In comparison with the English system, then, the salient features of the
American system would seem to be the following: i. Foreclosure without
sale was really as it is described "strict"; it operated summarily, harshly
and oppressively. 2. Foreclosure by sale, which was substituted for strict
foreclosure in an effort to protect mortgagors, has failed in its purpose,
since it is not a reliable method of determining the value of the security;
therefore, especially in times of depression, mortgagees, since they are
permitted to bid at the sale, may obtain the security at their own price,
free from the interest of the mortgagor; in a number of jurisdictions which
uphold powers of sale this may be done summarily and cheaply. 3. The
system is not adequate to protect mortgagors from the danger of "double"
satisfaction since it does not effectively prevent excessive deficiency
judgments. 4. The system, insofar as it permits receiverships for the
purpose of sequestering rents and profits pending foreclosure, operates
harshly from the point of view of mortgagors and, at the best, affords
mortgagees a poor remedy.
What then are the remedies? 0 The experiences of the recent depression
io6 During the depression the traditional rules were somewhat relaxed. See Suring State
Bank v. Giese et al., 210 Wis. 489, 246 N.W. 5 6 , 85 A. L. R. 1477 ('933) (confirmation refused
unless mortgagee would consent to a credit on the debt equal to the value of property as de-
termined by the court) and notes, 33 Col. L. Rev. 744 (1933); 17 Minn. L. Rev. 821 (1933);
84 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 223 (1935); 42 Yale L. J. 96o (1933); i Wis. L. Rev. 203 (1936); 1o4
A. L. R. 375 (r936). The relief usually given was either a postponement of the foreclosure or a
limitation of the deficiency judgment to the difference between the value of the security, de-
termined by the court or a jury, and the amount of the debt plus interest and costs; compare
the early American strict foreclosure practice; see note 1o3 supra.
X07 27 Mich. L. Rev. 797 (1929). zo See note 8o supra.
Xo9 See note io6 supra; Katz, Protection of Minority Bondholders, 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 517
(1936).
110 For suggested revisions of the New York system see Sutherland, 22 Corn. L. Q. 216
(1937).
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indicate that a comprehensive revision of the mortgage laws is needed. In
connection with such a revision it is believed that the English experience
will be helpful. In the light of that experience the following suggestions
are ventured.
i. After specified defaults have continued for a prescribed period the
mortgagee should be permitted to enforce the security either by a decree
of foreclosure without sale or by a sale either under a decree for foreclosure
by sale or under a statutory power of sale.x If the mortgagee elects to
obtain title under a decree without sale he should not be permitted to ob-
tain a deficiency judgment. If he elects a sale he should be permitted to
obtain a judgment for the deficiency, if any, which remains after the pro-
ceeds of the sale have been applied on the debt. But, having elected a sale,
he should not be permitted to purchase at the sale.
2. If the mortgagee has applied for a decree without a sale, the Court
should be authorized to order a sale upon the application of the mortgagor
or of anyone having an interest in the equity provided security is furnished
for the expenses of a sale. If a sale is ordered under these circumstances
the mortgagee should be permitted to protect his interest by bidding at the
sale.
3. Statutory rights of redemption should be abolished; they operate to
discourage bidding and, if the mortgagee is barred from purchasing at the
foreclosure sale, the principal justification for such rights will cease.
4. Receiverships should be restricted to cases in which the protective
device of a receivership is needed to prevent waste, or (to use the modern
but less elegant term) 'milking" of the security. It should not be avail-
able, as it is today, to sequestrate rents and profits pending a foreclosure.
5. If it is deemed desirable that the mortgagee should be able to obtain
rents and profits pending a foreclosure a summary method should be
provided to enable the mortgagee to collect rents from the mortgagor's
tenants (even though holding under leases subordinate) and, save perhaps
in the case of homesteads, from the mortgagor himself.
These changes it is believed would go far to protect both mortgagors and
mortgagees from the defects of the present system and, at the same time,
would not impose undue restrictions upon either group.
-' The foreclosure of bond issues should be covered by a special statute. In the absence of
such statute, the general foreclosure statute might well provide that if the obligation secured
be held by four or more persons the choice of foreclosure without sale or foreclosure with sale
should be determined in accord with the wishes of the holders of two-thirds of the obligation
secured. If foreclosure without sale is selected the court should be empowered to vest the title
perfected by the foreclosure in the persons designated to take title under a plan of.reorganiza-
tion which the court has approved as fair.
